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AWAKENING HONG KONG'S SLEEPING LION: A
CASE FOR INCREASED USE OF 0 62 r 8
Gregor A. Hensrude
Abstract: Hong Kong, like much of the world, is facing public criticism about the
operation and accessibility of its civil litigation system. One judge and scholar has
suggested increased use of a litigation rule requiring solicitors to pay any costs wasted by
their misconduct. By comparing this rule to its counterparts in the United Kingdom and
the United States, it becomes apparent that such a solution could work to improve
litigation in Hong Kong. Increased use of the rule would compensate parties injured by
abusive litigation tactics and deter solicitors from engaging in misconduct to line their
pockets or win for their client through unethical means.
I. INTRODUCTION
The cost of litigation is one of the greatest problems facing the legal
world today.' The legal system in Hong Kong is no exception.' This
Comment examines use of Rules of the High Court 0 62 r 8 ("the Rule" or
"0 62 r 8"),4 allowing costs5 to be assessed against a solicitor 6 for
misconduct, and concludes it should be used more often. In Hong Kong Law
Journal, Justice Litton, Non-Permanent Judge of the Court of Final Appeal
in Hong Kong, proposed increased use of 0 62 r 8,7 a rule allowing the court
Cliff Buddle, Justice for Sale, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 11, 2000, at 13.
2 For readers questioning the impact of the Chinese takeover on the rule of law in Hong Kong,
Hong Kong will maintain its own legal system, the common law framework and all existing laws, provided
they do not conflict with the Basic Law, which grants those rights. Joseph R. Crowley Program, One
Country, Two Legal Systems, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 10- 11 (1999) (giving a detailed analysis of how
this guarantee is actually working in Hong Kong).
3 Buddle, supra note 1.
4 HIGH CT. R. O 62 r 8 (H.K.).
5 It is important to note that in Hong Kong and the United Kingdom, the term "costs" has a different
meaning than in the United States. In the English system "costs include all legal expenses incurred in the
preparation and conclusion of a case. These costs include the legal fees charged by the solicitor and
barrister. With rare exception, legal fees constitute the lion's share of the costs." John F. Vargo, The
American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U.L. REV.
1567, 1606 (1993) (footnotes omitted). In contrast, the American definition generally expressly excludes
attorneys' fees as a part of"costs." See FED. R. Crv. P. 54(d)(1).
6 A solicitor is one of two types of lawyers in the English tradition followed by Hong Kong (the
other is a barrister). More specifically, in the United Kingdom a solicitor is "a legal adviser who consults
with clients and prepares legal documents but is generally not heard in High Court." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1399 (7th ed. 1999).
7 Though Justice Litton had other suggestions as well, they are outside the scope of this Comment.
See Henry Litton, Old Wine in New Bottles, 30 H.K. L.J. 351, 351-53 (2000) (suggesting that judges take a
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to order a solicitor to pay for costs wasted through his or her "ignorance or
incompetence.",8  This Comment concludes that increased use of 0 62 r 8
will help solve Hong Kong's litigation problem.
Justice Litton notes that the Rules of the High Court of Hong Kong
were modeled after the court rules of the United Kingdom, and questions
whether Hong Kong would also need to make radical reforms to its system,
as Britain has with the Woolf reforms. 9 A working party was formed in
Hong Kong to address litigation problems (i.e. cost, complexity, delay, and a
legal system that is not user-friendly), ° and has endorced many of the Woolf
reforms recently implemented in Britain." The reports of the working party
suggest, among other things, that courts take into account the conduct of the
parties when awarding costs.
2
Though other reforms may be desirable, even necessary, this
Comment examines increased use of 0 62 r 8 to deter misconduct and
compensate victims of solicitor misconduct as a way to improve civil.
litigation in Hong Kong. Part II of this Comment analyzes the litigation
system in Hong Kong to determine the scope of the problem and examines
the current use of 0 62 r 8. Part III attempts to predict the efficacy of
increased enforcement of the Rule by examining international examples of
similar rules, focusing on the United Kingdom and the United States,' 3 and
analyzes their effectiveness in curbing litigation abuse and decreasing cost.
Part IV examines some possible advantages and disadvantages of increased
use of the Rule. Finally, Part V concludes that that increased enforcement of
O 62 r 8 in Hong Kong would benefit the civil litigation system.
more commanding role in the future course of action under Order 25 r 1 and that the court analyze the costs
of each step before making an interlocutory motion, also under 0 25 r 1).
' Id. at 352-53.
9 Litton, supra note 7, at 351. The Woolf reforms are 365 pages of reforms to the Civil Procedure
Rules, said to be possibly the "most significant change in civil justice since... the 1870s." Colin Passmore
& Jonathon Goodlife, Ten Questions about the WoolfReforms, NEW L.J. (Eng.) 280, 280 (1999). They also
include hundreds of pages of practice directions, pre-action protocols, and court forms. Id.
10 Magdalen Chow, High Court Costs "Undermining Competitiveness," S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 30, 2001, at 2.
:2 See infra Part III.A.4 for further discussion of the Woolf reforms.
12 Magdalen Chow, Court Costs Shake-up Proposed, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 29, 200 1, at I.
13 Australia has a comparable rule, Federal Court Rule 0 62 r 9, which is supplemented by many
others. See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, WHO SHOULD PAY?. A REVIEW OF THE LITIGATION
COST RULES I (Oct. 1994). The Australian method of determining costs is also nearly identical to that of
the United Kingdom. Vargo, supra note 5. There appears to be substantially less discussion of the impacts
of the cost rules in Australia than in the United Kingdome and the United States.
VOL. I11 No. 2
HONG KONG'S R ULE 0 62 r 8
II. CIVIL LITIGATION IN HONG KONG
Justice Litton is not alone in his call to action to reform the litigation
process in Hong Kong. Even solicitors are calling for radical changes to the
system. 14  Justice Litton analogizes the system to the construction of a
building:
Imagine a scenario whereby a proposal is put to a company to
erect a building. No time limit is set. No ceiling is put on cost.
There is no assurance that, when finished, the building will
serve its purpose, or any purpose .... In the building field it is
unthinkable that a project could start without time and cost
limits-and perhaps penalties for time overrun. And yet, in the
field of litigation, this is a commonplace occurrence.
In a book review, David Leonard commented that a layperson might
think the subject of the book, The Professional Conduct of Lawyers in Hong
Kong, was a work of fiction.
16
The extremely high cost of litigation in Hong Kong has several
negative effects. First, the high cost makes Hong Kong less attractive for
business and undermine its economic competitiveness. 17 Second, the cost of
litigation deters those of modest means from pursuing litigation, 18 fueling
complaints that the courts are only accessible to the rich.' An additional
concem is that the 15,170 persons appeared pro se in civil cases last year.
2
0
The high number of those proceeding pro se, combined with the fact that the
system is not user-friendly to unrepresented litigants,2' spells disaster. One
litigator has called the cost of litigation a "crucial issue" in the public
perception of the legal system that the bench and bar must address.22
14 See Cliff Buddle, High Legal Costs Spark Reform Call, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 3, 1999, at
2.
is Litton, supra note 7, at 351.
16 David Leonard, Review: The Professional Conduct of Solicitors in Hong Kong, 27 H.K. L.J. 120,
120 (1997).
17 Chow, supra note 10.
'a Access to Justice, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 16, 2000, at 12.
19 Chow, supra note 12.
20 Jane Moir, Laying Down the Lawyer's Bill; Despite Often Prohibitive Costs of Litigation, the
Move Towards an Alternative is Slow, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 7, 2001, at 2.
21 Chow, supra note 10.
22 See Cliff Buddle, Legal Advocates in the SAR Can Command the World's Highest Fees, But Now
Judges-and the Public-Are Demanding Better Value, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 11, 2000, at 3.
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A. Elements of 0 62 r 8
Order 62 r 8 is the mechanism the Hong Kong courts use to
compensate victims of abuse of the legal process and punish wrongdoers.
The Rule states:
(1) Subject to the following provisions of this rule, wherein any
proceedings costs are incurred improperly or without
reasonable cause or are wasted by undue delay or by any
other misconduct or default, the court may make against any
solicitor whom it considers to be responsible whether
personally or through a servant or agent an order-
(a) disallowing the costs as between the solicitor and
his client; and
(b) directing the solicitor to repay to his client costs
which the client has been ordered to pay to other
parties in the proceedings; or
(c) directing the solicitor personally to indemnify such
other parties against costs payable to them.23
Examples of application of the Rule shed light on the standard used by
the courts to apply 0 62 r 8 and demonstrate how it has been used. The
proceedings are summary, saving the expense of a possible negligence or
breach of warranty action.
24
The Rule allows courts to impose costs on solicitors when they act
"improperly or without reasonable cause" or where there is "misconduct or
default" on the part of the solicitor.25 The Rule is applicable where the
conduct of the solicitor amounts to a "serious dereliction of duty. 26 The
dereliction of duty must in turn cause the wasted costs the party claims.27
Moreover, the solicitor's incompetence must take place in the course of
23 HIGH CT. R. 0 62 r 8 (H.K.). The rule goes on to specify the procedure for initiating proceedings
and the form the order may take. See id.
24 KB Chau & Co. v. China Fin. Trust & Inv. Co., [1996] 1 HKC 420, 1995 HKC LEXIS 797, at
*22-23 (H.K. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1995).
25 HIGH CT. R. 0 62 r8(l) (H.K.).
26 Que Jocelyn Co. v. Broadair Express Ltd. (No. 2), [1999] 4 HKC 381, 1999 HKC LEXIS 79, at *7
(H.K. Ct. of First Instance July 30, 1999).
27 See generally KB Chau, 1995 HKC LEXIS 797, at *22-23.
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litigation; incompetence in conducting a transaction that causes litigation is
not within the scope of the Rule.28
As the cost to the solicitor could be significant, the Rule has fairly
strict bounds. "Serious dereliction of duty" is a high standard, and authority
to invoke the Rule will be exercised "with care and discretion and only in
clear cases.",29  A "mere mistake or error in judgment is usually not
sufficient" to incur sanctions under the Rule.30 A court acts only where a
solicitor has failed in his or her duty to the court in a way that would serve to
"defeat justice.'
To establish the existence of the second element of a violation of the
Rule a court must ask, whether the costs "[were] wasted by ... misconduct
or default on the part of the [solicitor]. 32 However, the causal link between
the solicitor's misconduct and the wasted costs can be fairly weak. For
example, in Yau Siu Yuen, 33 where litigation services were performed by a
clerk, the court acknowledged that there was no guarantee that settlement
efforts would have been successful, but nevertheless stated the clients were
entitled to counsel from a solicitor instead of from a litigation clerk.34 The
court applied a relaxed standard of causation; the mere possibility the
misconduct resulted in wasted costs was sufficient to meet the causation
prong of the standard. The petitioner did not have to actually prove that
assigning the litigation clerk to do the work (the misconduct) caused the
settlement to be delayed (and wasted costs).
35
The third requirement is that the misconduct complained of must
occur in the course of litigation:
36
It is not enough that a solicitor's general conduct for a client
has been improper, in every case where a solicitor has been
made to pay costs, he has been proved of misconduct "in the
matter itself.
37
28 AIE Co. v. Kay Kam Yu, [1997] HKLRD 161, 163-64 (finding that "all of the cases in which
solicitors have been ordered to pay costs personally have been cases in which they were acting as solicitors
in the litigation in which the costs were incurred.").
29 Que Jocelyn Co., 1999 HKC LEXIS 79, at *7.
30 KB Chau, 1995 HKC LEXIS 797, at *14.
3" Id. at *14-15.
32 Id. at *22 (quoting 0 62 r 8).
33 Yau Siu Yuen v. Shing Cheuk Hing, [1999] 1545 HKCU 1, 1999 HKCU LEXIS 1316 (H.K. High
Ct. of H.K. Special Admin. Region Ct. of First Instance Dec 23, 1999).
14 1999 HKCU LEXIS 1316, at *17.
35 id.
36 AIE Co. v. Kay Kam Yu, [1997] HKLRD 161,163-64.
37 Id. at 164 (quoting In re Gregg [1869] LR Eq 137 per Lord Romilly MR, at 141).
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Thus, even if a solicitor commits misconduct which gives rise to an action, it
is not punishable under 0 62 r 8 if he was not at that time acting as an
officer of the court.
38
Another element in the operation of the Rule is that the court initiates
the process.3 9 This is because there is rarely incentive for the solicitor to
apply for a costs order against the opposing solicitor; the initial solicitor
does not care if the opposing solicitor or the opposing solicitor's client pays
the initial solicitor's costs. 40 Occasionally, a solicitor will file a motion for
wasted costs against the opposing solicitor to guarantee the injured party's
costs, 4' as where the client does not have the means to pay for the wasted
costs. Though Justice Litton advocates that the courts play an active role,42
judges do not initiate a substantial number of wasted costs proceedings.
However, if the court does participate, it can ask the solicitor to show why a
wasted costs order 43 should not be made where the opposing counsel has no
motivation to do so. 4
B. Application of 0 62 r 8
By way of example, in Yau Siu Yuen, costs were imposed against a
solicitor who had his litigation clerk handle the case almost entirely,
resulting in a mistake of law that may have led to a $1.2 million settlement
at the start of the trial.45 The court questioned how the action progressed so
far that while the defendant made such a substantial settlement, the plaintiff
was still unable to recoup costs. 46 The court imposed costs under 0 62 r 8
personally on the solicitors who had allowed the clerk to handle the case
almost entirely on his own.47
In KB Chau, the court held a solicitor responsible for filing a petition
to freeze the assets of a potential defendant in an action for a client who
38 Id. at 163-64.
39 Litton, supra note 7, at 353.
40 Id.
" KB Chau & Co. v. China Fin. Trust & Inv. Co., [1996] 1 HKC 420, 1995 HKC LEXIS 797, at *15
(H.K. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1995).
42 Litton, supra note 7, at 353.
43 "Wasted Costs Order" is the name generally given to an order under 0 62 r 8.
" Where a solicitor will already get his/her costs paid under the fee-shifting rule in Hong Kong,
there may be little incentive to expose the wrongdoing of opposing counsel. Litton, supra note 7, at 353.
According to Justice Litton, this is the "contest between the solicitor and his own client." Id.
45 Yau Siu Yuen v. Shing Cheuk Hing, [1999] 1545 HKCU 1, 1999 HKCU LEXIS 1316 (H.K. High
Ct. of H.K. Special Admin. Region Ct. of First Instance Dec. 23, 1999).
46 1999HKCULEXIS 1316, at *10-11.
" Id. at *I I.
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claimed to own a large bank.48 Presumably the solicitor knew that his client
did not own the large bank, but nevertheless proceeded to get the
defendant's assets frozen in an ex parte hearing by maintaining his client's
misrepresentation.49 The court found that all fees incurred after this
injunction were wasted, 50 and affirmed the order forcing the plaintiffs
solicitor to pay the defendant's costs.5'
In Que Jocelyn Co., a solicitor began a proceeding in the High Court
for a client who had expressed concern over keeping legal fees low. The
solicitor later failed to comply with an "unless order,",52 filed the case in the
wrong forum,53 and mishandled the offer to try to settle and reduce costs.
54
As a result of this misconduct, the court held that the solicitor was not
entitled to any pay for the work done55 and noted further that such conduct
"gives the legal profession a bad name. ' 56
Despite these examples, 0 62 r 8 is rarely used.57  The paucity of
authority illustrates this point.58 The infrequent use is possibly because the
law is a self-regulating profession, with few observers either qualified or
able to police solicitors or lawyers. Judges may be hesitant to apply the Rule
because of a sense of community and the fact that the bench and bar are in
close contact every day. The doctrinal reason that the rule isn't applied
often is the "serious dereliction" of duty standard. 59 A number of observers
caution the Rule should be used rarely and only in clear cases.60  Thus, a
potential solution to Hong Kong's civil litigation woes remains on the books
but is almost never utilized.
48 KB Chau & Co. v. China Fin. Trust & Inv. Co., [1996] 1 HKC 420, 1995 HKC LEXIS 797, at *15
(H.K. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1995).
49 1995 HKC LEXIS 797, at *15.
'o Id. at *20.
" Id. at *30-31.
52 The "unless order" stated that the plaintiff must serve his statement of claim by October 22, 1996
by 4:15 or the claim would be dismissed. Que Jocelyn Co v. Broadair Express Ltd. (No. 2), [1999] 4 HKC
381, 1999 HKC LEXIS 79, at * 10-11 (Ct. of First Instance July 30, 1999).
" Id. at "13.
s4 Id. at *20-22.
s Id. at *30.
56 Id. at *5.
57 Yau Siu Yuen v. Shing Cheuk Hing, [1999] 1545 HKCU 1, 1999 HKCU LEXIS 1316, at *17-18
(H.K. High Ct. of H.K. Special Admin. Region Ct. of First Instance Dec. 23, 1999).
s 1999HKCULEXIS 1316, at *17-18.
59 See generally Que Jocelyn Co. v. Broadair Express Ltd. (No. 2), [1999] 4 HKC 381, 1999 HKC
LEXIS 79, at *7 (Ct. of First Instance July 30, 1999) (stating that the standard is serious dereliction of duty
and that the rule should only be applied in "clear cases").
60 1999 HKC LEXIS 79, at *7. See also Yau Siu Yuen, 1999 HKCU LEXIS 1316, at *17-20
(explaining why the power to award costs against a solicitor is seldom used).
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III. INCREASED USE OF 0 62 r 8 AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO LITIGATION
ABUSE
Increased use of 0 62 r 8 may curb abuses of the litigation system and
achieve better client outcomes. There is evidence from similar jurisdictions
that it can help solve the problems currently plaguing Hong Kong. The
United Kingdom, the primary source of law in Hong Kong, has similar costs
rules. In the United States, another product of the British system, there is
further evidence of support for the Rule. The problem with providing data
to prove the solution will work is apparent by examining any of the three
countries; all three use their respective rules rarely. Thus, the examination
relies primarily on the effect of any changes to the rules and on the
predictions of scholars.
It is also important to note that the Rule has two purposes, to punish
the lawyer and to compensate the victim of the lawyer's incompetence.
61
The deterrent effect of punishment is the primary question presented here,
62
because in theory every costs order will compensate the injured party.
Thus, the question is whether the increased use of costs orders will result in
a "better" civil litigation system. Both the British and American systems
suggest an affirmative answer.
Before analyzing the other systems, a cautionary note should be
included about using comparative law as a mechanism to propose reform.
An outsider cannot fully understand any foreign system because many
factors interplay-with the legal system, any of which could jeopardize his or
her conclusions.63 As many geographic, economic, political, cultural and
sociological factors influence law, legal conclusions made without an
understanding of these factors are uncertain. 64
One author compares the transplantation of law with the
transplantation of a kidney versus a carburetor. 65  While the transplanted
kidney faces possible rejection, transplanting a carburetor from one
automobile to another is less risky.66 Using the British and American
examples to provide support for increased use of 0 62 r 8 should be seen
6' KB Chau & Co. v. China Fin. Trust & Inv. Co., (1996] 1 HKC 420, 1995 HKC LEXIS 797, at
"14-15 (H.K. Ct. App. Dec.13, 1995).
62 Theoretically, this is achieved with every costs order because the court determines the costs
wasted by the misconduct and orders the solicitors that caused the waste to pay that amount to the opposing
party. Thus, each order serves to rectify the exact amount of financial harm done.
63 Vargo, supra note 5, at 1598-99.
6 Id. (quoting 0. Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 2-6
(19742." 0. Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REv. 1, 5 (1974).
66 Id. at 6-7.
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more like the transplantation of a carburetor for two reasons. First, both the
United Kingdom and the United States share significant similarities with
Hong Kong. Second, this Comment argues simply for an increased use of an
existing rule, not wholesale adoption of a foreign rule. In conjunction with
support for the same proposal coming from within Hong Kong, these
comparisons carry a lesser risk of inaccuracy.
A. The British System as a Model for Comparison
The British system provides a clear model to compare with the legal
system in Hong Kong because the latter system grew from the former.
67
More specifically, one of the key cases in English costs jurisprudence, Myers
v. Elman, ,6 8 has been called "the leading case on the exercise of costs
jurisdiction" by a court in Hong Kong.69 Commentators also argue that
England has a crisis in its civil litigation system. 70 Further, the British have
a similar rule imposing costs on the solicitor for specified misconduct.71
Britain is not immune to complaints about the costs and problems
associated with civil litigation. The problems in the system are blamed for
preventing people from making or defending claims.72 The main problems
with the civil litigation system are cost, delay, and complexity. 73 An
engineering firm reported that the fees for litigation were higher in the
United Kingdom than any other place they operated, save perhaps the State
of California.74 One scholar posits that a possible reason for disenchantment
with the system is the aggressive approach taken by solicitors who try to
bully others into submission, run up costs, and then, on the eve of trial, turn
pessimistic and pressure the client to settle on poor terms.
75
67 See Litton, supra note 7, at 351 (noting that the Hong Kong Rules of the High Court are modeled
after England's rules). See also Joseph S. Daniels, Note: Comparing US. and Hong Kong Public Offering
Regulation: How Cost-Effective is China's Primary Capital Market?, 69 S.CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1832 (1996)
(noting that the legal system in Hong Kong is "generally based" on that of the United Kingdom).
Myers v. Elman, 1940 A.C. 282 (Eng.).
6 KB Chau & Co. v. China Fin. Trust & Inv. Co., [1996] 1 HKC 420, 1995 HKC LEXIS 797, at *14
(H.K. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1995).
70 John Heaps & Kathryn Taylor, The Abuser Pays: The Control of Unwarranted Discovery, 41
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 615 (1997).
71 Supreme Court Act, 1981, § 51 (as substituted by the Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, § 4).
7 Heaps & Taylor, supra note 70, at 616 (quoting LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: INTERIM
REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1995)).
7 id.
7" Id. at 616-17.
75 John Fisher, Strategic Errors Scare off Clients-Businessmen in Britain are Becoming
Increasingly Disenchanted with the Litigation System and the Solicitors Involved in It, L. SOCIETY'S
GAZETrE, June 14, 2001, at 15.
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1. The Elements of the British Rule
The British costs rule is quite similar to the Hong Kong rule. The
operative rule is Supreme Court Act 1981, section 51 (as substituted by the
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 section 4) ("British Rule").76 Wasted
costs are costs incurred "as a result of any improper, unreasonable or
negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or other representative or
any employee of such representative" or any costs the court feels under the
circumstances are unreasonable to have the aggrieved party pay.77 The court
has approved a three-part test to determine whether a wasted cost order
should be made:
(1) Had the legal representative of whom the complaint was
made acted improperly, unreasonably, or negligently?
76 Supreme Court Act 1981 provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this or any other enactment and to rules of court, the costs of
and incidental to all proceedings in:
(a) the civil division of the Court of Appeal;
(b) the High Court; and
(c) any county court, shall be in the discretion of the court.
(2) Without prejudice to any general power to make rules of court, such rules may make
provision for regulating matters relating to the costs of those proceedings including, in
particular, prescribing scales of costs to be paid to legal or other representatives [or for
securing that the amount awarded to a party in respect of the costs to be paid by him to
such representatives is not limited to what would have been payable by him to them if he
had not been awarded costs]
(5) Nothing in subsection (1) shall alter the practice in any criminal cause, or in bankruptcy.
(6) In any proceedings mentioned in subsection (1), the court may disallow, or (as the case
may be) order the legal or other representative concerned to meet, the whole of any
wasted costs or such part of them as may be determined in accordance with rules of court.
(7) In subsection (6), "wasted costs" means any costs incurred by a party-
(a) as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part
of any legal or other representative or any employee of such a representative; or
(b) which, in the light of any such act or omission occurring after they were
incurred, the court considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to pay.
(8) Where-
(a) person has commenced proceedings in the High Court; but
(b) those proceedings should, in the opinion of the court, have been commenced in a
county court in accordance with any provision made under section 1 of the
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 or by or under any other enactment, the
person responsible for determining the amount which is to be awarded to that
person by way of costs shall have regard to those circumstances.
Supreme Court Act 1981, s 51 (as substituted by the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 § 4).
77 Jean Cowley, Wasteland of Costs, NEW L. J., Apr. 26, 1996, at 597, 597 (quoting Supreme Court
Act 1981 § 51(7) (as substituted by Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 § 4)).
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(2) If so, did such conduct cause the applicant to incur
unnecessary costs?
(3) If so, was it in all the circumstances just to order the legal
representatives to compensate the applicant for the whole or
part of the relevant costs?
7 8
As in Hong Kong, courts in England can initiate costs orders.
79 Also similar
to the rule in Hong Kong, the British rule is intended to punish the
wrongdoer and compensate the victim.
80
The first requirement for imposing a wasted costs order in Britain is
that the solicitor's conduct was improper, unreasonable, or negligent.
8 1 Each
word encompasses a distinguishable behavior. "Improper" conduct is
conduct that would ordinarily justify a serious professional penalty or be
considered by the consensus of professional opinion to 
be improper.8 2
Circumstances under which impropriety can be found are rare, as the
standard "consensus of professional opinion," is fairly 
ambiguous.8 3
"Unreasonable" conduct is that which does not have a reasonable
explanation.8 4 "Negligent" conduct is the most controversial of 
the terms.8 5
The test is one of reasonable competence, but there is some leeway for
solicitors because they are in the "fog of war.",8 6  The court must also
examine the possibility of using other sanctions instead of awarding wasted
costs.
8 7
The second requirement is that the lawyer's misconduct caused the
wasted costs. "Without establishing this link the court has no jurisdiction to
make an order."88 The causal link must be established by the applicant.
89 If
the necessary link cannot be established, the case is appropriate for
79 Id. (citing Re a Barrister (Wasted Costs Order (No 1 of 1991), 1993 Q.B. 293)).
79 District Judge Michael Walker, Benchmarks-Rules of Engagement-A Look at the Eleventh
Update to the Civil Procedure Rules Amendments, L. SOCIETY'S GAZETrE, Feb. 10, 2000, at 42.
go John Lambert, Bad Conduct-Court Approval of Wasted Costs Orders, L. SOCIETY'S GAZETTE,
July 5, 1995, at 23.
8' Cowley, supra note 77.
8 Patti Brinley-Codd & Penny Lewis, Making a Case for Wasted Costs-Claims for Wasted Costs
Present the Courts with the Problem of Balancing the Public Interest against the Profession's Reputation,
L. SOCIETY'S GUARDIAN GAZETrE, Feb. 23, 1994, at 17.
83 Lambert, supra note 80.




88 Cowley, supra note 77.
89 Brinley-Codd & Lewis, supra note 82.
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disciplinary authorities, "but is not one for exercise of wasted costs
jurisdiction." 90
The third requirement is that, considering the totality of
circumstances, justice would be served by awarding costs to the injured
party.9 This element seems to allow the court to use its discretion by
refusing to apply sanctions where the technical test is met but the court
concludes there are circumstances that make sanctions inappropriate. The
court has stated there is a difference between the degree of negligence
necessary to establish a claim for wasted costs and that which the court
needed before making a finding of wasted costs. 92 Thus, even if a court
finds that the first two elements have been satisfied, the court still has
discretion to order or refuse to order costs paid by a solicitor.
93
2. Application of the British Rule
An important case for wasted costs jurisdiction, in Britain as well as
Hong Kong, is Myers v. Elman.95 Myers held that a solicitor who had his
clerk handle a case was liable for costs. 96 The court first noted that the
appropriate standard in costs indemnity was negligence 97 and that the
solicitor was liable for the actions of his clerk.98 The court determined that
the solicitor was guilty of professional misconduct for resisting some
discovery and filing false affidavits.
99
A more contemporary example of British wasted costs jurisprudence
is Re a Company (No. 006798 of 1995).100 In this case the solicitor filed a
winding up petition 1 on his client's request, perhaps to put pressure on the
company. 0 2 The court held that a solicitor acts unreasonably if he or she
signs the affidavit accompanying the winding up petition where he or she
has no grounds to believe that the company is insolvent based on the facts
90 Case Comment: Ridelagh v. Horsefeld, J.P.I.L., May 1995, at 57, 59.
91 Cowley, supra note 77.
92 Case Comment: Ridehalgh v. Horsefield, INSOLV. INT., 1993, 6(10), at 76.
93 Brinley-Codd & Lewis, supra note 82.
94 See note 69 (noting the case is the leading case on costs jurisdiction in Hong Kong).





:0o Re a Company (006798 of 1995) 1996 All E. R. 417, 1996 1 WLR 491.
1ol Such a petition requires the creditor to show that the petitioner is a creditor of the company and
that the company is unable to pay its debts. Id.
102 id.
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known to him or her.103 The court found that the creditor's solicitor in that
case had acted unreasonably, causing wasted costs incurred in opposition to
petition, and held her liable for those costs under section (6) of the Supreme
Court Act of 1981.1°4
3. Comparing the British and Hong Kong Rules
The only significant difference between the British rule and the Hong
Kong rule is the standard of proof. In Hong Kong serious dereliction of duty
is must be shown,10 5 but in Britain mere negligence will suffice.
10 6 The
Hong Kong court has explicitly rejected negligence as creating liability
under the Rule. 0 7 In theory this means the rule should be applied more
often in Britain, because negligence is a much lower standard than serious
dereliction of duty. At least one author feels the courts in Britain use the
wasted costs jurisdiction wisely, balancing the clients' interests and those of
solicitors. 08  Thus, the British Rule provides a good benchmark for
analyzing 0 62 r 8, as it is used more often than the Hong Kong rule in a
very similar civil litigation system.
4. Lessons Learned from the British Experience
Jean Cowley has made a list of things solicitors must avoid "at all
costs" to escape wasted costs orders. 109 The list includes pursuing hopeless
cases, acting without authority of the client, failing to consider whether
settlement is reasonable, failing to adhere to the trial timetable, not having a
full grasp of the legal issues, misleading the court, failing to consider the
consequences of litigating over-aggressively, and making procedural
applications which are misconceived. 0 If articles advising solicitors on
appropriate conduct arise from the use of wasted costs orders, the orders
seem to be serving their purpose. The intent is to clean up the litigation
103 id.
104 id.
1o5 Que Jocelyn Co. v. Broadair Express Ltd. (No. 2), [1999] 4 HKC 381, 1999 HKC LEXIS 79, at *7
(Ct. of First Instance July 30, 1999).
'6 See Cowley, supra note 77 (citing Re a Barrister (Wasted Costs Order No. 1 of 1991), 1993 Q.B.
293).
"o7 Yau Siu Yuen v. Shing Cheuk Hing, (1999] 1545 HKCU 1, 1999 HKCU LEXIS 1316 (H.K. High
Ct. of H.K. Special Admin. Region Ct. of First Instance Dec. 23, 1999).
108 Jacquetta Castle, Liability for Lawyers: A Review of Recent Developments, INT'L INS. L. REV.
1993, 1(12), at 413, 416.
109 Cowley, supra note 77.
110 Id.
MARCH 2002
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
process, and avoiding the actions listed above is undoubtedly progress
toward that goal.
Lord Woolf has led the British system toward increased use of costs
orders, which he sees as "controlling the excesses of parties battling in an
adversarial system.""' Woolf's reforms are substantial; among them he
maintains the wasted costs jurisdiction, but clears up the mechanics of its
use. 12 He sees costs orders as having a "salutary effect" on "members of
the legal profession."
' 13
While the final effect of the Woolf reforms has yet to be seen, they
were enacted after substantial inquiry with the intent to streamline litigation,
make it more responsive to the needs of the parties, and, where possible, to
encourage the parties to avoid litigation altogether. 14 Preliminary reports
suggest a reduction in the number of cases coming to solicitors as it is easier
to settle cases.1 15 Others suggest this reduction is not due to the Woolf
reforms, but is a result of people using other means to solve disputes because
the of the high cost of litigation. 16 Some have said that the Woolf reforms
have resulted in speedier, but more expensive justice. 17  Even critics
recognize the Woolf reforms as attempting to bring justice to the system
immediately, for present litigants, though some critics call for more effective
monitoring of the results of the reforms." 8
It should be noted that the Woolf reforms are substantially broader
than those proposed in this Comment, so data on their aggregate efficacy is
not decisive. In other words, even if the reforms as a whole prove to be
ineffective, it does not follow that increased use of costs orders would be
ineffective. Indeed, in light of the evidence presented in this Comment, the
opposite appears to be true, both in Britain and Hong Kong. For example, at
least one author believes that while the current rules in Britain are akin to a
straitjacket and the old rules akin to the courts doing virtually nothing, 119
there is a compromise to be had. He argues that while a litigant doing too
Heaps & Taylor, supra note 70, at 634.
112 Walker, supra note 79.
113 Heaps & Taylor, supra note 70, at 634 (quoting LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT
TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1996)).
114 Id. at 628.
115 Lucy Hickman, Solicitors Take Cover-as Insurance Companies are Reeling from the Fall-out of
the Terror Attacks on U.S., How a Shaky Market Could Lead to Fiercer Competition among Law Firms, L.
SocIry's GAZETTE, Nov. 8, 2001, at 20.
116 Fisher, supra note 75.
7 Martin Mears, Woolf- the Jury is Still Out?, NEW L.J. (Eng.), Nov. 24, 2000, at 1731.
"aI Nick Armstrong and Irwin Mitchell, Standards of Judgment-Effective Monitoring Must be
Introduced in Order to be Able to Judge the Success of the Reforms to Civil Justice, L. SOCIETY'S
GAZETTE, June 21, 1995, at 10.
'19 Martin Mears, Not Altogether a Success Story, NEW L.J. (Eng.), July 6, 2001, at 1008.
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little discovery is subject to an action by the client, a solicitor doing too
much might be "visited with a wasted costs order." 120 Increasing the use of
wasted costs orders might increase the incentive for the solicitor to seek the
middle position.
Given the number of extrinsic variables, gauging the effect of the
Woolf reforms will be difficult. It will be even more difficult to isolate the
increased use of costs orders against solicitors. Though aggregate data on
the results of the Woolf reforms is necessary to evaluate the reforms being
considered in Hong Kong, it is not crucial for assessing the increased use of
0 62 r 8. The specific data presented, both before and after the Woolf
reforms, suggests that wasted costs orders will be effective in Britain.
B. The United States as Mode 1 for Comparison
The United States is also a good mode I because it also largely adopted
the English system. The primary difference between Hong Kong and the
United States is that Hong Kong, like Britain, imposes litigation costs on the
losing party,' 2' whereas the general rule in the United States is that each
party bears its own costs. 12 2  However, this difference should have little
impact on evaluating the goals or efficacy of the Rule, as the Rule has two
purposes: to compensate the injured party and punish 
the wrongdoer. 1
23
The added risks of costs under the Hong Kong rule do not alter that
calculation; the "loser pays" costs rule probably even helps in controlling
satellite litigation, as explained below.
In addition, when a party pursues a frivolous claim, the English rule
merely creates a redundancy.' 24 The frivolity of the claim must be judged by
objective criteria other than the outcome of the case. 
2  Then, the costs are
payable to the injured party under the U.S. bad faith standard.
26  This
120 Id.
121 For the English Rule, see Vargo, supra note 5. For the Hong Kong rule, see Carole J. Petersen,
Preserving Institutions of Autonomy in Hong Kong: The Impact of 1997 on Academia and the Legal
Profession, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 337, 347 (1998).
12 For background on the American Rule, see Vargo, supra note 5. It should be noted, however, that
the United States has 200 federal fee-shifting statutes and 2000 state fee-shifting statutes, so there are
numerous exceptions to the "American Rule." Id. at 1588.
123 KB Chau & Co. v. China Fin. Trust & Inv. Co., [1996] 1 HKC 420, 1995 HKC LEXIS 797, at
*22-23 (H.K. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1995).
124 Vargo, supra note 5, at 1633.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1632-33. The "bad faith standard," as used here, is different, but closely related to the bad
faith standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. It rests on the court's inherent authority to impose sanctions against
its officers. See Joan Chipser, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 Hastings L.J. 319,
323-24 (discussing the history of the power). An attorney's fee award is appropriate under the federal bad
faith exception where "a party clearly violates the law and in the face of this clear violation obstinately
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argument is even more persuasive in the context of a rule, like that in Hong
Kong and the United Kingdom, which does not require a showing of bad
faith. In short, the method of paying for attorney's fees matters little in the
context of comparing sanctions, because sanctions create specific rules for
liability (apart from loss of the case) and impose specific penalties (i.e., the
costs wasted by a frivolous motion). This answers the argument that the
English method of awarding costs to the winner has "mystical curative
powers to deter nonmeritorious claims or defenses."'127 In addition, its
curative ability is questionable in light of the data regarding problems in
both Hong Kong and the United Kingdom. Thus, despite their different
costs rules, Hong Kong can be compared with the United States.
Litigation in the United States is criticized on the same grounds as in
Hong Kong and England. The American legal system is seen as in need of
reform.128 It is criticized for being inefficient, unfair, and uncertain. 2 9 The
United States has a higher rate of civil litigation than other industrialized
nations. 1
30
Lawyers bear the brunt of the criticism for the problems with the U.S.
litigation system. They are criticized for being self-interested, greedy,
deceptive, amoral, immoral, incompetent, and self-indulgent. 131 Lawyers are
accused of letting their own greed thwart needed reform. 32 This negative
perception of lawyers has practical implications. Some authors claim that
the situation in civil litigation threatens to undercut the civil basis of
society.133 The legal profession has also paid a toll; lawyers are the most
depressed profession, and a significant number of lawyers leave the
profession every year.' 34 Solving these problems will allow lawyers to focus
on justice and public welfare, restore the public trust, and maintain the
current disciplinary system.' 
35
forces the plaintiff to expend time and effort in preparing or conducting a lawsuit" or "a plaintiff brings a
groundless suit, a defendant asserts a baseless defense, a party proposes unnecessary petitions and motions,
or a litigant generally pursues a course of conduct that is vexatious or oppressive to his opponent." Id. at
329-30.
127 Id. at 1632.
128 Mary J. Davis, Summary Adjudication Methods in United States Civil Procedure, 46 AM. J. COMP.
L. 229, 230 (1998).
129 See Id.
130 W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why is the United States
the "Odd Man Out" in How it Pays its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 361, 363 (1999).
131 John P. Sahl, The Public Hazard of Lawyer Self-Regulation: Learning from Ohio's Struggle to
Reform its Disciplinary System, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 66 (1999).
132 George McGovern, It's High Time We Reformed America's Runaway Lawsuit Industry, DENV.
POST, Mar. 5, 1995, at E4.
133 id.
134 Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 647 (1998).
13 Sahl, supra note 131, at 68-69.
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Hand-in-hand with the criticism of lawyers is the concern over
frivolous lawsuits and defenses. Observers suggest that the high cost in time
and money of litigation forces a high settlement rate that promotes the filing
of bogus claims.136 Lawyers are further encouraged by the improbability of
sanctions for filing a frivolous lawsuit.137 By some estimates, one-quarter of
all suits filed in the United States are frivolous, with even higher percentages
in certain areas of the law. 138 Frivolous suits are blamed for causing many
other problems in the United States justice system, such as backlogs, delays
and high trial costs. 139  American authors are also calling for increased
sanctions to keep frivolous and fraudulent cases out of 
court. 40
1. The Current Rules in the United States
The United States has two federal rules that are equivalent in many
respects to 0 62 r 8. The traditional rule is "Rule 11',A41 which has been
136 Davis, supra note 128, at 231-32.
137 Vairo, supra note 134, at 628 (noting that lawyers file "stupid, senseless and baseless lawsuits"
because they get away with it).
138 McGovern, supra note 132.
139 See Robert Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 519, 520 (1997).
140 McGovern, supra note 132.
141 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 provides:
Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Representations to Court; Sanctions:
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an
attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's address and
telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute,
pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be
stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the
attention of attorney or party.
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting,
or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented
party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that
subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below,
MARCH 2002
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 11 No. 2
amended significantly twice in the last twenty years, 42 at least once in an
attempt to curb the very abuses this comment examines. 43  The closer
analogue to 0 62 r 8 is 28 U.S.C. § 1927,' 44 a little-used rule that reads:
impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated
subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made
separately from other motions or -requests and shall describe the
specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as
provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court
unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other period
as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense,
contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately
corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the party prevailing on
the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in
presenting or opposing the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances,
a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for violations committed
by its partners, associates, and employees.
(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an
order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate
subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show
cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule
shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in
subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives
of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to
the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses
incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party
for a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless
the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or
settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or
whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the
sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to Discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to
disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the
provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
142 See infra Part III.B. l.a.
13 The drafters of the 1983 amendment had two motives: "(1) to deter dilatory or abusive behavior;
and (2) to streamline litigation." Edward D. Cavanagh, Frivolous Litigation: Developing Standards under
Amended Rule I1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 499, 500 (1986).
14 See discussion infra Part III.B.l.b. In general, § 1927 is quite similar to 0 62 r 8 where Rule II
can apply to parties and is written and used more like a sanction than a compensatory measure. In its
present form, Rule 11 is intended almost entirely as a punishment measure.
HONG KONG'S RULE 0 62 r 8
An attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any
court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so
multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally
the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct. 145
The standards for Rule 11 and section 1927 vary by jurisdiction and by the
version of Rule 11 in effect at a given time.
a. Rule 11
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been significantly
amended twice since 1983. The first amendment, effective in 1983, featured
mandatory sanctions designed to streamline litigation and deter abuse of the
litigation process. 46 This version of Rule 11 eliminated judicial discretion;
violations such as abusive filings carried mandatory sanctions.147 The judge
had explicit authority to award the injured party attorneys' fees. 148 The 1993
amendment scaled back the 1983 amendments.149 The 1993 amendment
included a "safe harbor" provision and de-emphasized compensatory
sanctions.' 50 Currently Rule 11 does not allow a judge, on the court's own
motion, to make the wrongdoing party compensate the other party. 5'
Contrasting the 1983-1993 period with the post-1993 period demonstrates
the effectiveness of increased sanctions against attorneys, though it should
be noted that not all sanctions were compensatory.
i. Examples of use of Rule 11
A good example of the application of Rule 11 during its mandatory
sanctions period is Childress v. Kansas City.' 52 In Childress, the court held
that the plaintiffs answer to defendant's summary judgment motion was
14' 28 U.S.C.S. § 1927 (2001).
146 Cavanagh, supra note 143, at 511.
147 Kimberly A. Stott, Proposed Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: New, but not
Necessarily Improved, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 111, 120 (1993).
148 Cavanagh, supra note 143, at 500.
149 Vairo, supra note 134, at 594.
"0 Id. at 624.
' Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 208 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
152 Childress v. Kansas City, No. 91-2255-L, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14097 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 1992)
(unpublished op.).
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legally frivolous. 53 Plaintiff's counsel alleged that he was unable to answer
adequately because he had failed to get the cooperation of his client.154 The
court held the appropriate action in such a circumstance would be for the
attorney to secure plaintiffs permission to withdraw the suit or to withdraw
as counsel. 155  The court awarded attorney's fees to the defendant for
responding to plaintiffs answer because the award served the purposes of
Rule 11, to deter abusive litigation, punish abusers, compensate victims and
faci itate case management by streamlining dockets. 1
56
In contrast, 157 in Whitehead v. Food Max of Mississippi, the Fifth
Circuit recently overturned a district court decision awarding sanctions for
admittedly abusive conduct.' 58 In Whitehead the plaintiff, after receiving a
judgment, sought and attained a writ of execution from the district court.5 9
Within three days, he marched into the nearest Kmart with the news media
and U.S. Marshals to seize funds to satisfy the judgment. 60  While the
majority and dissent disagreed as to the reasonableness, given existing law,
of the plaintiffs assessment that there was no stay, 16 both sides agreed that
the plaintiffs actions in enforcing the judgment were "patently
inappropriate.' 62 However, the Fifth Circuit refused to sanction the plaintiff
either for attaining or enforcing the judgment and reversed the district
court's order that the plaintiff pay the defendant's attorney's fees accrued in
opposition to the execution of judgment (about $8,000). 163 The dissent
disagreed, calling this attempt to "harass the defendant" an "affront to the
judicial process" and "a mockery of the rule of law. '164
IS3 Id.
154 Id.
1'5 Id. at *4.
156 Id. at *2 (outlining the goals of Rule 11).
,7 This language does not suggest that this decision is a result in the change of the rules and that the
pre-1993 amendment would not have yielded the same result. That would be both nearly impossible to
determine and incredibly presumptuous. Rather, this case is offered to show an application of the new
version of the Rule, whether or not it is unique to this version.
'58 Whitehead v. Food Max of Mississippi., No. 00-60153, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 458 (5th Cir. Jan.
11,2002).
159 Id.
160 The attempt stopped only after the district court got word and ordered the plaintiff to stop and
participate in a conference call later that day. Id. at *2.
See id. at *13-14 (majority) and *24-32 (dissent).
162 Id. at *15.
113 See id. at *21.
'64 Id. at *17.
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ii. The efficacy of Rule II
During the 1983-1993 period of mandatory sanctions, Rule 11
litigation increased dramatically, leading some to declare the "experiment"
was a partial success in punishing violators. 65 Sanctions were imposed for
"misstating the law, bringing suits for revenge, and for failing to allege facts
necessary to state a particular cause of action."' 166  Sanctions were also
sought for legal errors like bringing groundless claims or improperly citing
the law.
16 7
While the 1983 version was not a cure-all, it was "a necessary tool to
encourage lawyers to devote close attention to litigation at the prefiling
stages." 168 A non-scientific study reported that most attorneys found the rule
had forced attorneys to "stop and think" before signing pleadings. 69 Every
empirical study confirms that lawyers conducted significantly more pre-
filing research than they had before the amendment,' 17 and that they did so
based on the threat of Rule 11 sanctions.' 71 Such results cut across every
line of geography and type of law practice. 172 Additionally, at least one
study found the 1983 version of Rule 11 decreased filing of boilerplate
defenses and counterclaims.
173
The emergence of Rule 11 after the 1983 amendments also raised the
consciousness of the bench and the bar as to abuses in civil litigation.
74
Judges used Rule 11 to remind attorneys of their obligations and to deal
effectively with frivolous cases.' 75 In turn, that "consciousness raising" may
have motivated the profession to develop positive strategies for improving
its image and restoring public confidence.
In addition, a study after the implementation of the 1993 amendments
showed the bench and the bar overwhelmingly supported a rule with both
165 Stott, supra note 147, at 129.
'66 Id. at 120.
167 Id. at 121.
161 Id. at 129.
169 Id. at 116 (citing Results of Rule 11 Litigation News Fax Poll, LrrG. NEWS, June 1991).
:70 Vairo, supra note 134, at 621.
'71 Id. at 622.
172 Id. at 622-23.
73 See id. at 632.
1 Id., at 590.
171 Id. at 625.
176 Id.
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compensatory and deterrent effect.' 77  As explained above, 0 62 r 8 also
serves these dual purposes, thus garnering additional positive endorsement
based on empirical opinion data.
Although the 1983 version was eventually repealed, perhaps because
it went too far in making the sanctions mandatory, 78 the experience in the
United States with the Rule 11 amendment sheds light on the increased use
of sanctions. Rule 11 achieved partial success in improving litigation, and
as many of its drawbacks have been addressed in Hong Kong's costs rule,
the principle of increased use of sanctions could be extended there with good
results.
b. 28 U.S.C. § 1927
Another basis for making lawyers pay for wasted costs is 28 U.S.C. §
1927. This statute, only applicable in federal courts, is rarely used because it
often requires a showing of bad faith. 179 The party seeking fees must usually
clearly prove bad faith and multiplication of litigation.' 80  It is also
unpopular because of its penal nature.181
i. The standard under section 1927
The Federal circuits are split on what standard should be used in
applying section 1927. 82 Some courts hold the court must find bad faith or
recklessness by the attorney, 83 while others use a lower standard. 84 In the
Seventh Circuit the standard is that the attorney, "though not guilty of any
conscious impropriety, 'intentionally ... pursues a claim that lacks plausible
or factual basis."'' 81 "Bad faith" is probably a higher standard than Hong
177 See Theodore C. Hirt, A Second Look at Amended Rule 11, 48 Am. U. L. REv. 1007, 1028 (1999)
(citation omitted) (discussing a study showing that two-thirds of the bench and bar, and nearly half of
plaintiffs attorneys support Rule 11 having a compensatory purpose).
178 The 1983 version was criticized because it raised a contradiction with the liberal pleading rules
otherwise present in the Federal Rules, was inconsistently interpreted and applied, generated expensive
satellite litigation, had a chilling effect on civil rights, contained inappropriate sanctions to cure
incompetence, and has been administered as a fee-shifting provision. See Stott, supra note 147, at 122-23
(citations omitted).
"7' Id. at 130.
'so Id.
181 Cavanagh, supra note 143, at 508.
182 Jones v. Continental Corporation, 789 F.2d 1225, 1230 (6th Cir. 1986).
183 Id. (citing Suslick v. Rothschild Securities Corp., 741 F.2d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir. 1984)); United
States v'. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1983).
14 Id. (citing Lewis v. Brown & Root, Inc., 711 F.2d 1287, 1292 (5th Cir. 1983), aff'd in part on
reconsideration, 722 F.2d 209 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1231 (1984)).
185 Id. (quoting Knorr Brake Corp. v. Harbil, Inc., 738 F.2d 223, 226-27 (7th Cir. 1984).
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Kong's standard of "serious dereliction of duty," whereas the lower standard
applied in some American courts is probably quite similar to the Hong Kong
standard. However, given the differences in the two systems and the
ambiguity of the language, it is almost impossible to compare the respective
standards. As already noted, both of the rules are used infrequently.
ii. Examples of the use of section 1927
In a rare example of section 1927 jurisprudence, sanctions were
upheld for filing a groundless summary judgment motion in Home Indemnity
Company v. Arapahoe Drilling Company.186 In Home, the plaintiff had filed
a complaint in district court and then agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of
the New Mexico Department of Insurance.'t 7 After the claim was decided
against the plaintiff and an appeal was pending, plaintiff filed for summary
judgment in the original district court action, arguing that some of the claims
had not been decided by the Department, or alternatively, that the
Department did not have jurisdiction.188 The district court found the filing
of the summary judgment motion had "unreasonably and vexatiously"
multiplied litigation and that filing the motion was not warranted by existing
law.' 9 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that sanctions under section
1927 are appropriate where the "attorney seeks to resurrect matters already
concluded." 90 It should be noted that both courts used Rule 11 almost
interchangeably with section 1927,191 again raising questions as to their
separate functions.
2. Lessons Learned from the American Experience
Before attempting to draw lessons from the experience with costs
rules in the United States, it is important to note that the standards for
applying attorney sanctions are slightly different in Hong Kong and the
United States. For example, the scope of Rule 11 is narrower than 0 62 r
8,192 though section 1927 is similar in scope to 0 62 r 8. The other
186 Home Indemnity Company v. Arapahoe Drilling Company, Inc., No. 92-2123, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 21937 (10th Cir. Aug. 27, 1993) (unpublished op.).
817 Id. at *2-3.
8.. Id. at *3-4.
89 Id. at *7 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1927). Sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 are reviewed for abuse of
discretion.
'90 Id. at *10.
'9' See id. at *2, *5, *6, *7.
"2 See NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 1993 AMENDMENTS TO FRCP 11 (for example, "this rule
applies only to assertions contained in papers filed with or submitted to the court"). While FRCP 11 only
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differences and similarities between the three rules have been used to
attempt to predict the efficacy of increased use of 0 62 r 8 in Hong Kong.
The first lesson is that Rule 11 is superior to section 1927 in curbing
abusive behavior because Rule 11 does not require the "subjective" element
of bad faith for the court to award sanctions. 93 The objective standard is the
"hammer" that causes attorneys to file meritorious claims. 194 This reflects
well on the Hong Kong solution, because "serious dereliction of duty" is an
objective standard. Second, increased use of sanctions has beneficial
impacts on lawyers and the legal system, as illustrated above by contrasting
the United States' experience with Rule 11 in its different forms. However,
Rule 11, and sanctions in general, are criticized for chilling creativity in
advocacy, generating satellite litigation, for being mandatory and thus
decreasing the probability of uniform enforcement, and creating a muddy
area of law. 195
The problem of satellite litigation must be primarily solved through
summary proceedings and court management, 196 though hearings and
ongoing appeals will continue to be a problem. Indeed, the excessive
number of filings under Rule 11 was one of the significant problems with the
1983 amendments.' 97 However, the large number of claims was possibly
because attorney's fees would not have been otherwise available under the
American rule. 198 As Hong Kong follows the English rule, the winning
party will receive attorney's fees anyway, so there is generally no motivation
to file such claims. 199
As to the other criticisms, the Rule is not mandatory in Hong Kong, so
the third criticism fades away. The law in Hong Kong concerning 0 62 r 8
is not nearly as muddy as Rule 11 case law, and is sufficiently settled to
provide solicitors with adequate notice. The one potential problem that
remains is the possibility of dampening creativity. This possibility calls for
effective enforcement, which will again benefit from a uniform standard that
does not require mandatory wasted costs orders in certain situations. An
added advantage of wasted costs orders in Hong Kong is that they
applies to written documents, 0 62 r 8 theoretically covers all oral activity as well. While FRCP II can
also be applied to parties (see FED. R. Crv. P. 11(c)), this Comment has attempted to moot that difference
by only examining the rule when applied to lawyers.
I Stott, supra note 147, at 130.194 Id.
195 Cavanagh, supra note 143, at 501-02.
"9 Litton, supra note 7, at 351 ("Procedural steps in litigation must henceforth serve these objectives:
they must not be allowed to spin offto become pieces of satellite litigation.").
197 Vairo, supra note 134, at 590.
9' Id. at 599.
199 Litton, supra note 7, at 353.
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compensate the injured party,2° ° which is not always the case under Rule 11
201sanctions.
Beyond these problems, the arguments for increased use of sanctions
are "sound, if not compelling., 20 2 The lessons of both Britain and the United
States demonstrate that the Rule can serve as an effective deterrent because
the bar takes notice when sanctions are imposed.20 3
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF HONG KONG
While both the American and British experience with costs rules tend
to support the proposition that Hong Kong should increase its use of
sanctions, there are additional issues specific to Hong Kong.
In Hong Kong, there is little discussion of use of Order 62 r 8. Justice
Litton has suggested "it may well be this mechanism should be used more
frequently," as it has an "immense advantage" of being "cheap and easy to
,,204operate. More recently, the working party analyzing litigation in Hong
Kong has suggested refining the existing costs rules to "take into account the
conduct of the winning party. 20 5 Though different from Justice Litton's
proposal, the implication of the working party's suggestion is very similar.
Thus, there is support for increased use of focused costs orders, and 0 62 r 8
specifically, in Hong Kong.
0 62 r 8 is not a perfect solution, and certainly will not solve every
problem in civil litigation in Hong Kong. For example, an attorney cannot206
recover his or her costs for defending against a wasted costs application.
Also, increased use of the Rule might encourage firms to require some
measure of indemnity for new solicitors.20 7 Further, if used too often, costs
208 cssodr a o
orders distract the solicitor from litigation. Finally, costs orders may not
always be effective.
209
200 See KB Chau & Co. v. China Fin. Trust & Inv. Co., [1996] 1 HKC 420, 1995 HKC LEXIS 797, at
*22-23 (H.K. Ct. App. 1995).
201 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (c)(2), supra note 141 ("A sanction imposed for violating this rule shall be
limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated.").
202 Cavanagh, supra note 143, at 533.
203 Id. at 516 (noting that even unpublished opinions "nevertheless have an impact on the bar").
204 Litton, supra note 7, at 353.
205 Chow, supra note 12.
206 Brinley-Codd & Lewis, supra note 82, at 17.
207 Yau Siu Yuen v. Shing Cheuk Hing, [1999] 1545 HKCU 1, 1999 HKCU LEXIS 1316, at *18
(H.K. High Ct. of H.K. Special Admin. Region Ct. of First Instance Dec. 23, 1999).
208 Id. at 17-18.
209 lain Goldrein, QC & Margaret de Haas, QC, Winning on a Conditional Fee-P1 and Clinical
Negligence, 2, NEW L.J. (Eng.), Feb. 4,2000, at 129 (quoting Rose, LH in Freudania Holdings Ltd., TIMES,
Dec. 4, 1995).
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First, while the system in Britain and Hong Kong generally awards the
costs to the winning party,21° the same mechanism does not exist in wasted
costs orders. Thus, a lawyer may choose to pay a wasted costs claim rather
than risk both reputation and billable hours. 21 ' The proceedings are often
more expensive than the amount at stake.21 2 There are two answers to this
problem. First, the Rule envisions a summary proceeding, 213 which reduces
the cost to both parties (solicitor and client) in a wasted costs proceeding.
Second, the court must be trusted with the discretion to either make the
solicitor show cause or choose not to require a showing. Judges make these
decisions every day, and are presumed qualified to do so by virtue of their
position. Admittedly, it is a "tightrope between... protection of the public.
and the protection of the profession from unmeritorious claims, 2 14 but
that is an acceptable risk.
Second, it is also possible that wasted costs orders could have a
disproportionate impact on young solicitors because firms will force them to
get additional liability insurance.215  There is no empirical evidence to
support this theory. There is no evidence of differential treatment of young
solicitors in the three countries surveyed. There is also no evidence to show
that an increased use of these sanctions would have this effect.
Third, at least one judge has suggested the reason costs orders are
rarely used is that they distract attorneys who should be concentrating on
litigation.216 The theory is that a solicitor would then spend time considering
the consequences if he loses the case, afraid to make any false step.2 17 While
this concern is valid, it also supports the theory that the sanctions would be
useful. Some amount of thinking about the results of one's actions-
analogous to the "stop and think" under Rule I 1-will improve the civil
litigation system. Otherwise, the Rule serves only to issue retribution and
recompense. The goal is the prevention of misconduct, the elimination of
backlog, and the assurance that every action taken by a solicitor is both for
the good of the client and not an abuse of the legal system. Moreover,
judges must be trusted to exercise appropriate discretion in using the Rule.
The proposal is for increased use of the Rule, not mandatory use of the Rule.
20 See note 121.
211 Brinley-Codd & Lewis, supra note 82.
212 id.
213 Litton, supra note 7, at 353.
214 Brinley-Codd & Lewis, supra note 82.
215 Yau Siu Yuen v. Shing Cheuk Hing, [1999] 1545 HKCU 1, 1999 HKCU LEXIS 1316, at *18
(H.K. High Ct. of H.K. Special Admin. Region Ct. of First Instance Dec. 23, 1999).
216 1999 HKCU LEXIS 1316, at *17-18.
217 Id. at *18.
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Finally, critics in America and Britain argue that costs orders against
solicitors are not always effective.2 18 Not even the most die-hard advocate
of wasted cost orders would assert that they could single-handedly solve the
problems inherent in litigation. Indeed, it is too early to determine whether
sanctions are in fact an effective deterrent.2 '9 Further, given the number of
variables, it will be difficult to ever know whether and to what extent
sanctions are effective. However, it is also very possible that the result of
consistently and properly imposed sanctions will bring "marked
improvement in our backlogged calendars, thus enabling better access to our
,,220
courts by deserving litigants.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Litton's suggestion that Order 62 r 8 should be used more
often to streamline the justice system in Hong Kong is a good one. First, the
Rule is simple and easy to apply. Next, there is evidence of some
enthusiasm for this solution in Hong Kong. Looking at the rules in United
States and Britain, there is evidence that similar rules in Hong Kong could
improve the system. Where an hourly fee is charged, litigation is not a zero-
sum game, for both sides benefit from a solution that reduces their legal
costs. 2 2 1 This is exactly the goal of Order 62 r 8. Most litigation, where the
solicitors are acting responsibly, would not see any increased risk.
However, in those few cases where solicitors are purposefully driving up the
cost, to intimidate the other party or line their own pockets, the Rule is
relevant. Use of 0 62 r 8 will compensate the victim and will probably deter
similar conduct in the future.
The only question that remains is how to increase use of the Rule.
Increased use could be accomplished by lowering the standard by which a
costs order can be applied (i.e., lowering it from the serious dereliction of
duty standard to the English standard of negligence) or codifying the
increased use (i.e., in a way analogous to the 1983 version of Rule 11). The
increased use of 0 62 r 8, in whatever form, is a proposal worth serious
consideration.
218 See, e.g., Goldrein & Haas, supra note 209.
219 Thomas E. Baker, Proposed Intramural Reforms: What the U.S. Courts of Appeals Might Do to
Help Themselves, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1321 (1994).
220 Fred Woods, Sanctions-Stepchild or Natural Heir to Trial and Appellate Court Delay Reduction,
17 PEPP. L. REV. 665, 681 (1990).
221 William Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 367, 396
(1999).
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